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Abstract
An account of the specific ill of Native American mascots—that is, 
the particular racism of using Native Americans as mascots, as dis-
tinct from other racist portrayals of Native Americans—requires 
a fuller account of the function of mascots as such than has pre-
viously been offered. By analyzing the history of mascots in the 
United States, this article argues that mascots function as symbols 
that draw into an artificial unity 1) a variety of teams existing over a 
period of time and thereby 2) a community of individuals who are 
thus able to use that team as their own symbolic locus of unifica-
tion. This unification of teams and their concomitant communities 
is accomplished by appeal to a symbol that facilitates a particular 
fantasy of collective identity. The usage of Native American mas-
cots is racist not only because it involves stereotypical portray-
als of Native Americans, but (more specifically) because it treats 
Native persons simply as a means to symbolic unification—and 
not, importantly, as members of the community they thus serve. 
In other words, in these cases mascots work as unifying signifiers 
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precisely by being the purely instrumental facilitator of a group's 
collective fantasy of itself.
Keywords: Native American mascots, mascots and racism, race and 
sports, racism in the United States
The residents of Ossining pride themselves on living in an 
“ethnically diverse” community. One of the threads that bind 
the community is attending Ossining schools and representing 
the Ossining Indians. I feel that the use of the Indian mascot 
unites Ossining.
The Forrest Hills Board of Education voted 5–0 on July 19 to 
retain the Anderson High School Redskins mascot, because 
of the overwhelming support shown by students, parents, 
teachers and members of the community. It was made clear to 
the board that the Redskins mascot belongs to the students and 
alumni of Anderson, and that it will not be given up because of 
pressure or intimidation from outside groups such as the American 
Indian Movement.
—Letters to the Editor by supporters of Native American 
mascots, quoted in Silva 2007. Emphasis mine.
This is a paper about mascots. It is, in one way, a paper about mascots 
and race—specifically, about what makes certain types of mascots racist. 
But it is also about mascots and social ontology—that is, about what a 
mascot is, how mascot-like symbols function, and about their role in the 
metaphysics of teams. This paper addresses both of these things because it 
seems to me that one cannot adequately account for the specific ill of using 
Native Americans as mascots without considering the function of mascots 
more generally. One could, of course, offer compelling arguments that 
demonstrate the racist status of Native American mascots insofar as these 
are instances of the dissemination of stereotypical or derogatory images 
of Native Americans, as Ward Churchill (2003) and others have done, or 
demonstrate the psychological harm caused by these images for Native per-
sons, as Fryberg (2008) has done. Such work is important, and arguably 
correct in its assessment of the imagery of Native Americans that sports 
teams with Native American mascots reinforce. What this work does not 
do—indeed, does not aim to do—is to explain what is different about the 
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usage of such images of Native Americans as mascots, as distinct from their 
usage in film, books, and so on. I will argue in what follows that an account 
of this specific ill—that is, the specific problems of using Native Americans 
as mascots—requires a fuller account of the function of mascots as such. 
In this paper, I aim to offer just such an account. My argument will thus 
have implications not only for the ethical debate about Native American 
mascots, but also, as I will explain, for a central metaphysical question in 
the philosophy of sport.
Though the adoption of sports team mascots has been a ubiquitous 
practice in North America for some time, little philosophical work has 
addressed mascots’ general significance, symbolic or social functions. 
The vast majority of the theoretical work that exists on mascots—in either 
Philosophy or the social sciences—takes up the task of arguing about the 
ethics of Native American mascots, and (in general) defending the claim 
that the usage of Native American mascots is indefensibly racist. This con-
clusion is, I believe, the correct one. It is curious, however, that so many 
people have defended the claim that such mascots are racist without care-
fully defining what a mascot is in the first place. Now, to be fair, it’s not true 
that no one in the anti-Native-Mascot camp has considered this problem. 
Those who have done so, however, have often been arguing from highly 
contestable or even false premises, which do not systematically investigate 
the usages or functions of actually existing mascots. If we are going to reject 
team names like “the Redskins”—and I think we should—then let us do it 
on sound grounds. The grounds we need require a philosophical investiga-
tion of the use of mascots as such—its purpose and function as a symbolic 
practice existing within a particular social/historical context.
In what follows, I will argue that mascots function as signifiers that 
draw into an artificial unity 1) a variety of teams existing over a period of 
time and thereby 2) a community of individuals who are thus able to use 
that team as their own symbolic locus of unification. My argument will 
proceed as follows: first, I will clarify my usage of the term ‘mascot’ and 
analyze some data on actually existing mascots in order to explain why we 
ought to reject the dominant arguments against Native American mascots. 
Next, drawing on the thought of John Searle, I will suggest that mascots 
are better understood as contributing to the constitution of something 
than merely describing or symbolizing it. Third, through a brief histori-
cal investigation of the evolution of professional sports mascots, I will 
argue that the unification of teams and their concomitant communities is 
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accomplished by appeal to a symbol that facilitates a particular fantasy of 
collective  identity. Thus, the usage of Native American mascots is racist, 
I will argue, not only because it involves stereotypical portrayals of Native 
Americans, but (more specifically) because it treats Native persons simply 
as a means to symbolic unification—and not, importantly, as members of 
the community they thus serve. In other words, in these cases mascots work 
as unifying signifiers precisely by being the purely instrumental facilitator of 
a group’s collective fantasy of itself.
“Mascots,” “Racism,” and the Problems of Previous Accounts
In this section, I want to offer some terminological clarifications, and set 
out some data that supports the claims I have made about the inadequacy of 
previous accounts of mascots. First, when I refer to mascots, I have in mind 
a collection of related practices, some of which could be called by different 
names, depending on one’s particular purposes. Often, for example, people 
distinguish between a team’s nickname—say, the “Tigers”—and its mas-
cot—say, “Mike the Tiger.” Or, more controversially, we might distinguish 
between the nickname “Illini” and the mascot “Chief Illiniwek.” Now, there 
are good reasons for making this distinction. One might argue, as the NCAA 
did, that the portrayal of Chief Illiniwek by a white student “playing Indian” 
is more ethically objectionable than the simple use of a nickname associ-
ated with Native Americans (NCAA 2005). However, I will not maintain 
this distinction here. The reason for this is twofold: first, in most cases, it is 
quite tricky to maintain a clear dividing line between nicknames and their 
idealized material instantiations. On what side of the boundary, for example, 
do official team logos bearing physical representations of the nickname fall? 
The second, more important reason is that (as I will argue) these practices of 
naming and physically representing a name have, in the case of sports fan-
dom, the same symbolic function and effects. Thus, statements against the 
usage of Native American imagery by sports teams have treated “mascots,” 
“images,” “iconography,” “nicknames” “symbols” “logos,” “personalities” 
and “artifice” as equivalent, and as subject to the same censure (NAACP 
1999, National Congress of American Indians 1993, US Commission on 
Civil Rights 2001, Five Civilized Tribes Intertribal Council 2001, American 
Psychological Association 2005). Whether a name is spelled out on a uni-
form or symbolically instantiated by a plush representation, the ostensible 
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purpose is to represent the particular team with which it is associated. 
Following both pragmatic and poststructuralist accounts of meaning, then, 
I am suggesting that we understand names and mascots as part of a constel-
lation of practices that give rise to a particular social effect—and thus that 
they are not meaningfully distinct for my present purposes (even if there 
may be other purposes for which such a distinction could be usefully main-
tained). So, unless I note otherwise, when I refer to a team’s “mascot,” I am 
referring both to the various forms of iconography that represent it (whether 
in two-dimensional depictions, human or humanoid costumes, or uniforms 
symbolic of it). I am choosing to foreground the mascot feature of these 
practices, rather than the nickname, the colors, or something else, because 
it makes these practices salient as a system of symbols that relies on ideal-
ized representations of the things they purport merely to signify, which, I will 
suggest, is important for their functionality.
Second, I am following Paul C. Taylor in using “racism” in a broad 
sense that includes any form of disregard for persons of a particular 
race. Defining racism in this way, according to Taylor, includes “the 
withholding of respect, concern, good-will, or care from the members 
of a race,” (Paul C. Taylor 2013, 32) leaving open the possibility that 
such withholding may be intentional or unintentional, and located pri-
marily in the consequences of actions and practices or in the conscious-
ness of individual agents. I thus allow that racism may take a variety of 
forms, and be a characteristic of a variety of entities, including “people, 
actions, beliefs, practices, institutions, and attitudes” (34). Consequently, 
in order to demonstrate that the usage of Native American mascots is 
racist, I do not believe that I need to show that, say, a particular fan of 
the Atlanta Braves intends to ridicule Native Americans when she or he 
performs the “Tomahawk Chop.” It will, instead, be enough to show that 
the usage of the “Braves” mascot ( including the “Tomahawk Chop,” and 
other associated symbolism) involves disregard for Native Americans. 
With these terminological clarifications in mind, I will briefly address 
the data behind my rejection of at least some of the arguments that have 
been made about Native American mascots to date. To compile this cur-
rent data, I examined the mascots used in the four major professional 
“revenue sports” leagues in the United States: the National Football 
League, Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association and 
the National Hockey League.1 When looking closely at the types of pro-
fessional sports mascots currently in use,2 it is clear that although one 
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might suggest that nonhuman animals constitute a plurality of mascots 
today (depending on our classificatory schema), this menagerie is, to the 
contrary of claims made by some of the most well known opponents of 
Native American mascots (King and Springwood 2001, 55–56), far from 
the majority.3 Indeed, nonhuman animals represent less than one third 
of all major league sports mascots in the United States. There are, in 
fact, more human figures used as mascots—even excepting the special 
case of Native American mascots for comparative reasons—than there 
are animals. Although this ratio does differ from sport to sport, even 
football, which has the highest percentage of animal mascots, features 
animal mascots for slightly less than fifty percent of its teams. At the col-
lege level, where nonhuman animal mascots are more prevalent than at 
the professional level, they still comprise only about half of current col-
lege mascots. It is thus difficult to sustain the claim that Native American 
mascots simply treat Native Americans as animals—or, at least, it is dif-
ficult without significant supplemental argumentation.
table 1 types of mascots in major us sports leagues, 2013
All Major US Sports
Animals 40
Persons by Occupation 30
Persons by Location 11
Natural Objects/Phenomena 12
Human-created objects 7
Native Americans 5
Clothing Color 4
Mythical Persons 4
Supernatural beings 3
Arts 3
Other ethnic groups 2
Individual Names 1
Total Mascots 122
Football
Animals 15
Persons by Occupation/Activity 8
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Mythical Persons 3
Native Americans 2
Human-created objects 1
Persons by Location 1
Individual Names 1
Supernatural beings 1
Total Mascots 32
Basketball
Animals 8
Persons by Occupation/Activity 8
Human-created objects 5
Natural objects/phenomena 4
Persons by location 2
Human arts 2
Ethnic groups 1
Total Mascots 30
Baseball
Persons by Occupation/Activity 9
Animals 8
Persons by Location 5
Clothing Color 3
Native Americans 2
Mythical Persons 1
Supernatural Beings 1
Natural Objects/Phenomena 1
Total Mascots 30
Hockey
Animals 8
Persons by Occupation/Activity 5
Natural Phenomena 5
Persons by Location 3
Human-created objects 2
Natural Objects 2
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Native Americans 1
Supernatural beings 1
Clothing color 1
Human arts 1
Other Ethnic Groups 1
Total Mascots 30
It is also important to consider the breakdown of the types of persons 
who are used as mascots. Philosopher Peter Lindsay has argued that, when 
humans who are not Native Americans are used as mascots, these refer-
ences are to specific human groups that do not exist any longer (such as 
Vikings) and thus can be trivialized through their use in sports. (Lindsay 
2008, 212–13) Lindsay claims that Native Americans are thus mistreated 
by being implicitly relegated to this “trivial” class of persons when they are 
used as mascots. Here again, I do not think that this claim on its own is 
defensible when considering the sheer number of mascots that explicitly do 
represent actually existing persons, and do so in a plainly valorizing way: 
this is especially true in the case of the category of persons who are known 
by their location—such as the Islanders, the Mets, etc.—and ethnic groups 
other than Native Americans such as the Celtics, and the Canadiennes.
Still, the content of the symbols, figures, and persons used as mascots 
does matter. One would have to engage in some fairly serious philosophical 
obtuseness not to notice that choices of mascots are not arbitrary, and that 
only certain sorts of things seem to work as mascots. In order to make sense 
of this, though, we will have to do two things: first, we will need to under-
stand what it means for a mascot to “work”; second, we will need to examine 
the content and context required for this “working.” In the next section, 
I will address the first of these two issues.
The Signifying—and Unifying—Function of Mascots
In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault concludes that, far from being 
a natural kind, “the notion of ‘sex’ made it possible to group together, in 
an artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, 
sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this ficti-
tious unity as a causal principle” (Foucault 154). Foucault’s claim is that 
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the rise of certain medical and psychiatric practices produces a category of 
knowledge—sex—that comes to be understood as the unitary point of ori-
gin from which an incredible variety of disparate phenomena supposedly 
proceed. Now, although there is not a science of mascots, their function 
as signifiers, as I will argue, is quite like that of “sex.” Or, perhaps better, 
a mascot is a primary means by which a “team” is unified and figured as a 
unitary point of origin.
This is perhaps a counterintuitive claim, so let’s analyze an example: 
the New York Yankees. First, it’s important to note that, today, that which is 
signified by the term “New York Yankees” is more complex than it initially 
appears. We will, of course, want to say that it signifies a baseball team 
located in the Bronx, being composed of a particular set of individuals, per-
haps including a manager and front office organization. But once we begin 
to enumerate the necessary constituent parts of the Yankees, we run into 
problems. Let us say, for example, that Alex Rodriguez is finally released 
from his contract—will the Yankees still exist? Yes, of course; even if A-Rod 
had been a necessary feature of an adequate extensional definition of the 
Yankees up to that moment, the act of his release would render the mean-
ing of “the Yankees” unequivocally distinct from him.
Yet, the meaning of “New York Yankees” is further complicated when 
we consider that its meaning is not merely limited to isolated instances of 
time. Rather—and just as importantly for fans—the “New York Yankees” is 
an entity that persists over time, despite innumerable personnel changes. 
Thus, fans and commentators are able to “follow the Yankees,” to track 
the evolution of “their” performance, to expound upon the significance of 
“their” leading the all-time series against “their” rivals, the Boston Red Sox. 
And yet, there are significant respects in which there is not a team “there”: 
rather, there are innumerable teams over the course of years. For, not only 
is there not the same team year to year; ‘there’ is often not even the same 
team from one month to the next (or even, arguably, one play to the next). 
Still, as Stephen Mumford puts it, the allegiance of sports fans depends on 
“the endurance of its intentional object,” the team, despite the fact that it is 
quite difficult to specify, “what the endurance of its object consists in. Even 
a gap in existence seems to be no insurmountable obstacle to [a team’s] 
identity” (Mumford 188). How, then, does the notion of a team—with life-
time records, championships won, lifelong fans, and so on—function?
Mumford argues that teams are “social substances,” by which he means 
that their identity is “to a degree conventional and conspiratorial” (191). 
104 ■ critical philosophy of race
In other words, teams exist over time to the extent that enough of the 
 surrounding community of observers treats them as such. Thus, Mumford 
argues, “one of the components that are constitutive of the substance 
and its persistence through time is the intentional allegiances of which 
they are the object” (ibid.). Or, in other words, although the practices of 
sports fandom require an intentional object toward which fandom (or, to 
use Mumford’s language, “allegiance”) is directed, that intentional object 
is significantly constituted by sports fandom. However, Mumford claims 
that there must be “at least some metaphysical grounding” for the agree-
ment by sports fans that there is a singular team ‘there’—but grants that 
specifying this grounding is indeed quite dicey: there seem to be no neces-
sary or sufficient conditions for identity of teams other than this agreement. 
Still, Mumford argues, something must persist in each case that will “per-
suade enough people that the conspiracy is sufficiently rational” (Mumford 
2004, 192).
Specifying the “something” whose persistence grounds the identity of 
the Yankees involves us in a Ship of Theseus–esque puzzle that will be 
insoluble as long as we assume that a team is like an artifact, or even like 
a “substance,” however social that substance may be. If, however, we allow 
that a team may not, strictly speaking, be an object, but instead a name 
for a certain pattern of relationships, then the problem may be more man-
ageable. In his book, The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle argues 
that many features of the social world are simply the product of “collective 
intentionality.” These “social facts” are dependent upon individuals shar-
ing “we intentions,” which can range from “we are executing a pass play 
[in football]” to “we are having a cocktail party.” In every case, the social 
fact created—whether it be playing football or having cocktails—is depen-
dent for its existence, in part, on the collective agreement of the individuals 
involved (Searle 1995, 26).
Now, one might draw on this argument to claim that the underly-
ing metaphysical essence of the Yankees is the collective intentionality of 
the players—their “we intentions” to be a team together. But, while it is 
surely correct that such collective intentionality on the part of the players 
is a necessary condition for being a team, it is certainly false that their col-
lective intentionality is enough to make them that team, the Yankees. You 
and I may collectively intend to play together as the Yankees, but while we 
may form a team, we lack the relevant agreement from our wider social 
milieu to make us part of the team that included, at various points, Babe 
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Ruth, Mickey Mantle, and Reggie Jackson. This is because that team is an 
example of what Searle calls an “institutional fact”—a collectively imposed 
function that is dependent upon collective agreement for the function to be 
possible (41). Institutional facts, like the value of money and scoring points 
in football, depend upon a collective agreement about “status-functions” 
of certain phenomena. Such facts, according to Searle, depend upon an 
agreement of the form “X counts as Y in [context] C” (46) for their exis-
tence, since, apart from such an agreement, there is nothing about the 
exchange of bits of paper or the carrying of a ball across a line that makes 
them significant—and, indeed, apart from this agreement there is no such 
thing as “money” or “points” at all. Thus, institutional facts or objects are 
fundamentally patterns of interaction, regulated by collective agreement 
about the status of a certain phenomenon: namely, that it (X) will have a 
particular function (Y) in some specified context (C). In the same way that 
collective social agreement governs when and where the utterance of cer-
tain words will result in my being married, it is collective social agreement 
that governs the continued existence of the Yankees, and their persistence 
over time. There is no way to be “married,” just as there is no way for Ruth, 
Mantle, and Jackson to be members of the same “team,” apart from the 
agreement that makes these functions possible.
Whether this agreement is rational or not is perhaps as difficult a ques-
tion in the case of money as it is in the case of sports fandom. In each case, 
we seem to be involved, as Searle puts it, in a kind of circular justification: 
the Yankees exist because people believe that they do. I take no position 
here on the rationality of the agreement, because it seems to me irrelevant. 
Even if we grant that the collective intentionality of fans or money-users 
is entirely self-referential, this will not change the status of Babe Ruth or 
a hundred-dollar bill, nor, importantly, the real consequences that would 
follow our attempts to will ourselves to be Yankees, or a person’s thieving 
of such a bill. Still, it is perhaps more difficult to imagine why we might col-
lectively agree to the existence of the historically persistent Yankees than to 
the value of money, since the functions made possible by this institutional 
fact are more saliently useful than those made possible by a professional 
baseball team.
Answers to this “why” question need not, however, take the form of 
rational justifications. Sports fandom in general is decidedly a-rational. 
Allegiances to sports teams, like allegiances to friends and family mem-
bers, are, even if rationally justifiable, primarily felt, or in Mumford’s 
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words, experienced as “emotional attachment.” (Mumford 2004 184) For 
this reason, it is unclear why such emotional attachments would need to 
be metaphysically grounded in a way that is “rational”—they might just as 
well, I think, be grounded in vague feelings of connection or heritage, or 
even in the felt imperative to follow social convention. In fact, the motiva-
tion required for treating a team as a team may very well be precisely affec-
tive, and caught up with the desire of fans to identify with (or against) its 
fortunes. Mumford even admits that such fantasies of identification are a 
key feature of allegiance to a sports team when he writes: “part of the object 
of the allegiance is the supporters themselves: They support an entity of 
which they are a part” (193). However, Mumford suggests that this interest-
ing feature of sporting allegiance is a consequence of his account of the 
identity of sports teams, rather than a constitutive feature of them. But, if 
we take seriously the extent to which fan behavior is constitutive of a team’s 
identity (as Mumford suggests), we will have to acknowledge that such 
behavior need not be (and often is not) motivated by the rational appeal to 
a metaphysical grounding, but could instead be motivated by an affective 
attachment that need not be particularly rational. If this is true, then I think 
we must ask not “to what are fans becoming attached,” but rather, “what 
are the mechanisms whereby fans become attached” to a team, such that there 
could be “a team” there?
Returning to Searle’s description of the mechanism involved in the 
collective imposition of status-functions is helpful here. Status-functions 
(which, again, take the form “X counts as Y in C”) are not only depen-
dent upon collective intentionality, but also upon language. In order for X 
to “count” as Y in some context, the members of the relevant group must 
agree to collectively represent it in the same way. As Searle puts it, “physi-
cally X and Y are exactly the same thing. The only difference is that we have 
imposed a status on the X element, and this new status needs  markers, 
because, empirically speaking, there isn’t anything else there.” (Searle 69) 
These markers can be words or word-like symbols, Searle claims (75), but 
in every case, such “collective representation . . . requires some vehicle. 
Just scrutinizing or imagining the features of the X element will not do 
the job.” (74–75) Considering our previous examples of Ruth, Mantle and 
Jackson (RMJ) illustrates why we need such markers. RMJ do not share any 
intrinsic features that obviously make them members of the same team; 
though they shared we-intentions with their own teammates from time to 
time, RMJ never shared such we-intentions as a group, since they never 
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played together. Yet, it is undeniable that RMJ “count” as members of the 
 historically persistent team, the Yankees. That they function as such is only 
possible because of a linguistic practice that marks them with this status.
A mascot is just such a status-marking linguistic practice. The primary 
function of a mascot, I think, is to facilitate the collective agreement and 
attachment of fans. In so doing, these markers draw together disparate per-
sons, events, plays, losses, wins, riots, championships, ticket sales, and so 
on, into an artificial unity—a team—that is then, in Foucault’s language, 
understood as that which underlies all of these things, or is their causal ori-
gin. The institution of a mascot (as name and symbol) is a discursive prac-
tice that makes possible the sense of the numerical identity of a team, and 
thus contributes to the constitution of it. Mascots, then, both represent and 
help to bring about that which is represented. Importantly, they need not do 
this through literal speech acts—symbols like colors or animals or Yankees 
pennants can work just as well.
Moreover, the unifying signification of mascots is not carried out in 
isolation, but is more or less explicitly connected to the identification of a 
team with the community it represents. That is, the unification of disparate 
entities and phenomena into the historically persistent “Yankees” facilitates 
the identification of the Yankees with individual persons from New York. It 
is by subsuming the multiple and changing individuals who make up these 
teams into the symbol of the team that I, as a fan, am able to identify with 
their fates.4 Thus, the secondary function of the team-constituting institu-
tion of mascots is, I think, the identification and unification of a group of 
people (fans) who conceive themselves as related to one another at least in 
part because of their relations to that team. In other words, mascots work 
not only to constitute a team, but also to enable the self-identification of 
a fan base, which is a particular sense of collective or communal identity. 
Thus, when the symbol of the mascot draws together innumerable ele-
ments into a supposedly unitary “team,” it does this, I think, for a larger 
purpose: facilitating the sense of a larger artificial unity: the community.
In order to investigate the connections between the unification of a 
team to the unification and/or identification of a larger community, I want 
to examine one more example, this time one that is closer to home for me, 
as a native of south Louisiana: the LSU Tigers. In the case of the Tigers, we 
have the same major symbolic elements of the Yankees: individuals sub-
sumed to a larger symbol in order to reiterate the existence of a continuous 
historical entity (here, LSU football). This subsumption was dramatically 
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illustrated in the Tigers’ ritual introductions on the Jumbotron preceding 
each 2012 home game in Baton Rouge’s Tiger Stadium: as each starting 
player’s name was announced (to the cheers of the 90,000 assembled 
Tiger faithful), a video image of him in LSU uniform, yellow helmet and 
all, appeared on the large screen. As though the uniform were not enough 
to enact his rebirth as one “Tiger” among many, the image of each player’s 
face was, for a moment, digitally altered to appear with disturbingly realis-
tic stripes, yellow eyes, and a catlike version of his own visage (LSU Starting 
Lineup Video 2012). The individuals in question were able to become 
meaningful as representatives of the fans in the stands, or as local heroes, 
precisely by being dramatically brought under the sign of the mascot.
The local pride that is fostered by such symbolic unifications-by- mascot 
should not to be underestimated. The everyday dealings of hometown 
or regional teams are reported on in excruciating detail in local papers; 
devoted fans discuss the fortunes of ‘their’ teams using the pronoun “we,” 
not “they”; the cities and supporters of rival teams are mocked as unsa-
vory in some way or another. (Zagacki and Grano 2005) Moreover, teams’ 
fan bases are overwhelmingly localized: fans tend to form allegiances to 
teams local to their hometowns—which are stable in cases where individ-
ual persons move away, but which do not always survive the relocation of 
the team to another locale. In other words, as social scientists who study 
sports fandom have suggested, one of the primary functions of contem-
porary sports fandom is to foster a sense of community belonging, in an 
increasingly fragmented metropolis. (Hognestad 2012, Danielson 1997, 5) 
My claim, then, is that this communal “we” that is fostered, encouraged, 
and performed by the nearly ubiquitous fan chant, “we’re number one,” is 
itself facilitated by the institution of mascots—apart from which it would 
be much more difficult to find a “we” to identify with at all.
But what is it about the mascot that makes this “we” workable? In other 
words, what is it about mascot symbols that enable them to function in 
this doubly identifying way? If successful mascots function to facilitate the 
unification of a team and its concomitant community, we should be able 
to articulate what is necessary in order for a particular signifier to be able to 
work as a mascot—but we should not necessarily expect that those condi-
tions of efficacy require anything like rationality, strictly speaking. Because 
the meaning and effectiveness of a signifier is ultimately dependent upon 
its context, my investigation of the conditions of mascots’ efficacy will 
 proceed historically.
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Mascots’ Evolution and Efficacy
In a 1907 article, a sports reporter for the New York Times wrote, “Local 
patriotism, as manifested in baseball, is a strange, irrational pastime. The 
crowd of local patriots have no hesitation in violently applauding this season 
as a native the same player whom last year they violently hissed as an alien 
enemy” (Danielson 9). This turn of phrase illustrates what a good  mascot 
must do: it must be powerful enough to make friends of my enemies, and 
to make family of strangers. We must, somehow, come to feel that the 
honor of our community is at stake in the batting, tackling, and shooting 
fortunes of people who may have minimal knowledge of our geographi-
cal origins, our traditions, or even our language.5 What kinds of symbols 
can accomplish this? If we look at our contemporary classes of mascots all 
at once,6 I think that we will be at a loss to explain the panoply of  figures 
there  represented—and this may be why there are such wide- ranging, and 
sometimes unsatisfactory explanations (as discussed in section one) for 
the origins and problems of Native American mascots. Instead, I think it 
will be more productive to again take a hint from Foucault, and consider 
that, when dealing with discursive practices, one should not expect uni-
vocal explanations, or historically neutral or static phenomena. So, in a 
Foucaultian spirit, I want to do a brief historical analysis of the advent and 
development of professional baseball and football7 mascots in the United 
States, paying attention to the moments of discontinuity and division, 
rather than continuity and unification.
When we view the history of professional baseball and football teams 
and their mascots8 historically, it is striking how very little continuity 
there is between the earliest forms of mascots or team names, and the 
most recent. It is, in some ways, difficult to imagine how the images of red 
stockings (1869), on the one hand, and diamondbacks (1998), on the other, 
could be equally (or even similarly) effective as unifying signifiers—or, it is 
at least difficult to imagine this at their advent. One could easily imagine a 
signifier like a red stocking becoming culturally meaningful given time and 
agreement in usage; a pragmatic account of meaning should expect no less. 
The story is more complicated, however, when one considers a context in 
which these signifiers are new.
The earliest such signifiers—such as the Athletics, Redcaps, and 
Brownstockings of nineteenth-century baseball—are purely descriptors of 
the team, in either its location (the Philadelphia Athletic Club), or apparel. 
110 ■ critical philosophy of race
This trend was largely repeated in professional football, with the addition of 
names that simply reflected the occupation of its athletes, and/or the spon-
soring business entity. Significantly, though, these teams were not simply 
members of a glorified beer league; they were professional teams, generat-
ing enough fan loyalty to support a business—and ultimately, a big busi-
ness, that was organized into the revenue-generating machines of Major 
League Baseball and the National Football League. And yet, such teams did 
generate such fan loyalty and identification by, apparently, asking fans to 
identify with the color of a sock.
But this isn’t quite true, of course: the name, and the uniform, in 
these early cases, is almost incidental—and it is so precisely because 
the work of unification it must perform is already supported (or, per-
haps, accomplished) by other means. Who is that team? Well, they’re 
the team from the Philadelphia Athletic Club, from Cincinnati, from the 
Panhandle Railroad, or from the Jefferson Park neighborhood. In these 
early cases, the naming looks much more like a description. It is, largely, 
merely significant of what is already “there”: a group of people united by 
living together in a particular locale. Indeed, in these early days of pro-
fessional baseball and football, many players—even professional ones—
were literally from the cities and neighborhoods for which their teams 
were named. In such cases, the team’s being that team is not dependent 
upon the standard institutional fact rule, “X counts as Y in C.” Even 
though the team is a social fact characterized by collective intentionality, 
it is precisely the sort of case that Searle describes thusly: “the ‘rule’ does 
not add anything but a label, so it is not a constitutive rule” (44). Names 
of this sort are simply labels for pre-existing characteristics, meaning that 
being identified with that team is simply a matter of sharing those char-
acteristics (notably, local origins). Given this reality, it is not difficult to 
imagine fans developing an attachment to or identification with a team. 
This sort of identification is of a piece with other familiar forms of local 
pride.
What seems quite different, however, is the “irrational” local patrio-
tism documented by the 1907 Times reporter—the sense of a community 
whose boundaries and kin are being constantly remade by changes in 
contract and sock color. This change in sports fandom, it seems to me, 
tracks changes in the development of the cultural practices of sport—and 
marks the emergence of true mascots as we know them today. As base-
ball and football become increasingly professionalized, and their athletes 
commodified, the teams involved become increasingly heterogeneous, 
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and decreasingly identified with their locales through birth or background. 
This is displayed prominently in table 2, where increasing professional-
ization and  commodification of baseball and football are marked by the 
advent of organized professional leagues, restrictions on players eligible 
to be treated as professional, the institution of drafts, and the advent of the 
 highly-publicized signings of “star” athletes. In concert with these develop-
ments, players are traded or accept lucrative contracts far away from their 
childhood homes. Competition between proliferating leagues (not to men-
tion teams) drives this diaspora of athletes and desire for a hometown team 
that will still, somehow, inspire civic pride. Along with increasing profession-
alization and commodification, then, we see the emergence of names—of 
mascots—that conjure increasingly powerful, even fantastical, images. 
Who are we? We are the Broncos! We are the Yankees! We are . . . the 
Indians.
table 2 baseball mascots chronologically with developments in 
racial segregation and professionalization*
1860 Philadelphia Athletics
1869 Cincinnati Redstockings
1870 Chicago Whitestockings
National League founded; segregation instituted (1870)
1871 Boston Redstockings
1876 Boston Redcaps
1882 New York Gothams
1883 Boston Beaneaters
1883 St. Louis Brownstockings
1885 New York Giants
1885 St. Louis Browns
1887 New York Metropolitans
1887 Pittsburgh Allegheneys
1888 Brooklyn Bridegrooms
1890 Chicago Colts
1890 Cincinnati Reds
1890 Philadelphia Phillies
1891 Brooklyn Grooms
1891 Pittsburgh Pirates
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1894 Detroit Tigers
1894 Grand Rapids Rustlers
1894 Sioux City Cornhuskers
1895 Detroit Wolverines
1895 St. Paul Apostles
1898 Chicago Orphans
1899 Brooklyn Superbas
1899 St. Louis Perfectos
1900 Cleveland Lake Shores
American League Founded (1900)
1900 St. Louis Cardinals
1901 Baltimore Orioles
1901 Boston Americans
1901 Chicago White Sox
1901 Cleveland Blues
1901 Washington Senators
1902 Chicago Cubs
1902 Cleveland Broncos
1903 Cleveland Naps
1903 Los Angeles Angels
1903 New York Highlanders
1907 Boston Doves
1908 Boston Red Sox
1911 Boston Rustlers
1911 Brooklyn Trolley Dodgers
1912 Boston Braves
1913 New York Yankees
1915 Cleveland Indians
Minor League Draft instituted (1921)
1932 Brooklyn Dodgers
1936 Boston Bees
1936 San Diego Padres
Reintegration begins (1947)
1961 Minnesota Twins
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Amateur Draft Instituted (1965)
1965 Houston Astros
1969 Kansas City Royals
1969 Montreal Expos
1969 Seattle Pilots
1970 Milwaukee Brewers
1972 Texas Rangers
1977 Seattle Mariners
1977 Toronto Blue Jays
1993 Colorado Rockies
1993 Florida Marlins
1998 Arizona Diamondbacks
1998 Tampa Bay Devil Rays
2005 Washington Nationals
2008 Tampa Bay Rays
*Includes mascots of NL and AL teams (current and defunct), plus professional teams later admitted to 
MLB. In cases where a “new” team takes the same name or mascot as a previously existing team in the 
same location, I have used the earlier date.
Even these more fantastical images, of course, are of various types. 
At times, as in the case of the Yankees, these images are simply idealized 
images of the community itself. The community cloaks its athletes in a 
vision of itself or of its proudest moments, and they become Texans, or 
Patriots, or Yankees, no matter their personal origins. And, importantly, 
the projection of this idealized image allows these teams to represent the 
community itself in this idealized way.
But, other symbols are of an apparently different sort. The Tigers, the 
Spartans, the Falcons, the Tornadoes, the Jets, the Vikings, the Astros, the 
Rockies—these images are, I think, fantastical images of power, force, and 
legendary or even superhuman capability. These images are the stuff of 
Hollywood films, larger-than-life embodiments of daring, danger or might 
itself, even though they refer, literally, to entities or objects whose actual 
existence is (or was) far more mundane. The vagaries of actual existence, 
truthfully, are not the point in the case of these mascots. It does not mat-
ter whether individual Norse men were fearsome in battle, or even if they 
wore the famous horned helmets—just as it does not matter whether actual 
Tigers or Falcons pose a physical threat to humans, as we destroy their 
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habitats, nor whether the machinery of a jet engine (short-lived as it is) is 
a worthy model for the bodies of our athletes. What matters, instead, is the 
collective fantasy of power or aggression that they inspire—the sense that 
we, too, become fearsome or daring when identified with them. This class 
of cases involves the invocation of ideals associated not with a specific fea-
ture of the community itself, but with the force of winning in  competition—
and this is the class to which Native American mascots belong. As Laurel 
Davis points out, “Native Americans are stereotyped as wild, aggressive, 
violent, brave, stoic, and as having a fighting spirit, traits commonly valued 
in  athletics” (Davis 1993, 12).9
In a third class of cases of long-standing team names (such as the 
Reds, the White Sox, or the Red Sox), the unifying signifier becomes a mas-
cot, insofar as it conjures images of the heroes of yore, or the ‘tradition’ of 
the community that was their home. In each of these three cases, though, it 
is important to note that the literal content signified by the mascot is impor-
tant only to the extent that it conjures an image of the community as ideal, 
powerful, historically significant, or some combination of the three. Some 
images simply will not do—feminine figures, for example, are apparently 
unworkable, as are any other images tainted in the cultural imagination as 
weak; also unworkable, in many cases, is a mascot from a team’s previous 
location, particularly if it is too evocative of that region or its people. The 
important thing, in each case, is that the content of the mascot image mat-
ters, not because its adopters have substantial interest in the literal thing or 
person signified by them, nor because it is makes a rational appeal to some 
metaphysically grounded continuity, but to the extent that the adoption of 
this mascot can produce a forceful enough image to serve as an instrument 
of unification whose meaning is not limited to its literal referent.
One might suggest, at this point, that the fantastical images of commu-
nal identity that I have described here are not, in fact, nearly so important 
as the marketing strategies employed by the owners of these professional 
teams, whose financial goals are achieved precisely by inciting the sort of 
brand loyalty evinced by dedicated sports fans. There is a vast literature on 
marketing and the commodification of identity, which has established the 
significant role of advertising and the fetishization of capitalist consump-
tion in the reproduction of contemporary subjectivities (Hebdige 1979, 
McCreanor et al. 2005, Crogan et al. 2006). On such accounts, the com-
modification of sports works precisely to make a “‘consumer’ feel like a 
‘fan’ . . . through consumer goods.” (Crawford 2004, 81) It is, in other words, 
115  ■  erin c. tarver
“through consumer goods that the ‘fan’ can increase their  knowledge, and 
more importantly, display their commitment . . . and [thus] feel increas-
ingly integrated within their chosen supporter community. For crucially, 
this is what the contemporary sport venue sells” (ibid.). Thus, one might 
argue, once we have reached the level of cultural practice operative in pro-
fessional sports team mascots in the United States what might appear to 
be the identification of a community—say, in “Red Sox Nation”—is only a 
very successful branding campaign. The “metaphysical grounding” in such 
a case would thus be nothing more than the skill of professional marketers, 
who dupe individuals into believing that their own identities are at stake 
in the support of a particular team—which is to say, a particular business.
There is clearly a significant marketing element in the production and 
consumption of mascots (and thus, of sports teams), and nothing in my 
argument is meant to reject the notion that the identity of contemporary 
teams and their concomitant fan bases are inextricably bound with their 
places in the capitalist economy. On the contrary, I have suggested that the 
advent of increasingly fantastical mascot images is largely necessitated by 
the community fluctuations occasioned by the increasing commodification 
of professional sports and athletes. However, accepting this claim does not 
entail that we necessarily accept that mascots are reducible to ad campaigns. 
Indeed, it seems to me that a sufficiently robust account of the effects and 
functions of mascots must not accept such a reduction. Reducing mascots 
simply to effective branding fails to explain the difference between fan loy-
alty and simple brand loyalty—why, that is, even the most loyal purchasers 
of Coca-Cola or Budweiser do not tend to think of themselves as members 
of a community, nor act as though the product they consume as integral 
to their identities in some way. Moreover, simply writing off mascots as 
marketing tools and sports fans as dupes does not address the specific con-
tent of that marketing, or the fantasies that make it compelling. In other 
words, even if it is true that mascots are examples of effective marketing 
(and again, I do not deny that they are), leaving the analysis here fails to 
explain the specific character of fan involvement—an involvement which 
is, again, in large measure constitutive of the entity (or “team”) being mar-
keted. Although it is crucial to recognize the role of consumption in the 
practice of sports fandom, then, a robust account of mascots requires both 
attention to the content of the mascot-images that facilitate communal iden-
tification, and a recognition of the active role of sports fans in adopting 
mascots—and thereby, communities. I have attempted to do precisely this 
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by offering a historical analysis of the advent and content of mascot images 
that takes the fandom activity of community constitution and community 
identification seriously.
The Instrumentalization of Native Americans as Mascots
I have argued that mascots are unifying signifiers that facilitate the 
 constitution of historically persistent teams, and in so doing, to enable the 
identification of a community with its team. Historical analysis reveals that 
the content of the mascot image must be sufficiently powerful (in at least 
one of three ways) to make this latter unification possible. We are now, 
finally, in a position to return to the question of Native American mascots. 
Keeping in mind the function of mascots, and the means by which this 
function is accomplished, I want to conclude by articulating why the mas-
cotting of Native Americans is so deeply troubling.
Following the implications of my argument, the use of Native Ameri-
cans as mascots is the usage of Native American persons as instrumen-
tal facilitators of a fantasy of communal identity. This usage is facilitated 
through a fantastical caricature of “the Indian” that ‘works’ as an image of 
the  second type I described in the last section—an image of power and vio-
lence. Rather than functioning as an idealized image of the actual commu-
nity it represents, “The Indian” as a mascot reduces innumerable peoples, 
families, and cultures to a fearsome symbol that may be adopted purely 
to foster a sense of the (white) community it represents as powerful and 
daring—as the star of its own Hollywood film. The realities of the lives of 
actual indigenous people are immaterial to this usage; this fact is made 
disturbingly vivid by the performance of rituals like the “Tomahawk Chop” 
by a sea of mostly white, foam “tomahawk”-wielding fans to the tune of 
a caricatured Native drum beat. These images are certainly, as Churchill, 
Fryberg and others have pointed out, stereotypical and degrading, and 
their effectiveness as mascot images seems dependent upon the reiteration 
of these stereotypical images (it is difficult to imagine portrayals of, say, 
contemporary life on the reservation as effective mascots). We could, in 
fact, stop here, and note that the proliferation of these derogatory images, 
despite the protestations of Native American groups, involves a clear dis-
regard for a group of persons based on their race—and thus, constitutes 
a racist practice. As I suggested in the beginning, however, I think that 
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there is a particular ill associated with using these images as mascots, and 
to understand why, we must recognize what the usage of such images in 
this context implies.
More than treating Native American persons as inconsequential or as 
reducible to a simple stereotype, their mascotting requires the tacit exclu-
sion of actual indigenous people, for their inclusion could disturb their 
effectiveness as a symbol that facilitates the unification of a (white) com-
munity to which they, decidedly, do not belong. In other words, although 
Native American mascots are, in significant respects, ‘like’ mascots of 
Vikings or Astros (insofar as they are figured as images of human power), 
their insidiousness lies in their peculiar combination of instrumentaliza-
tion and exclusion. The usage of “the Indians” or “the Redskins” as a unify-
ing signifier requires both the reduction of actually existing persons to an 
image capable as serving as the medium of a fantasy of communal identity, 
and the elimination of these actual persons from the community so con-
stituted, lest they disturb the fantasy—or, more pressingly, pose a threat 
to the community instrumentalizing them. Ironically, that is, the figure of 
“the Indian” as a powerful image requires envisioning actual indigenous 
persons as literally powerful, violent, threatening or intimidating to those 
treating them as mascots. This is the image of Native Americans as savage 
threat to white civilization, which must be eliminated—unless their power 
can be contained and harnessed for ‘our’ own purposes. The use of Indian 
mascots, in short, involves the tacit reiteration of a sentiment that has more 
or less explicitly characterized white supremacy: these people exist for us.
The extent to which Indigenous peoples are purely instrumentalized 
by Native American mascots is made more salient when we consider the 
racialized limits of the teams and communities they served to constitute, 
and the surrounding cultural context that makes their caricatured images 
effective. The Boston Braves, the first professional team in the United 
States to make use of a Native American mascot, did so in 1912—forty-
two years after the “gentleman’s agreement” that institutionalized racial 
segregation for the National League, and only twenty-two years after the 
massacre at Wounded Knee. The few Native American athletes who were 
allowed into the league during this period faced significant racist taunt-
ing, including “war whoops . . . [and] ki yis” from fans, “silly poetry . . . 
and] hideous looking cartoons” from the local sports media, and the nearly 
ubiquitous nickname of “Chief” from their teammates (Vascellaro 2011). 
Their status as racially marked outsiders was made consistently clear, even 
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as fantastical images of that marking were being used as symbols for the 
team and community that denied them full membership. Similarly, the 
NFL’s oldest Native American mascot still in use today—the Washington 
Redskins—was adopted in 1933, the year that racial segregation was insti-
tuted in professional football.10 Prior uses of Native American mascots in 
professional football included teams named after existing baseball fran-
chises (the Cleveland Indians and the Boston Braves), and, in one notable 
case, a “publicity stunt” team comprised entirely of Native players who 
toured the country for the explicit purpose of drumming up sales for the 
owner’s dog kennel business. (Pro Football Hall of Fame 2013) Even the 
leader of this “all-Indian” team, Jim Thorpe, who went on to be named 
the greatest athlete of the twentieth  century in 1950 after success in a 
handful of other professional football teams and the 1912 Olympics, was 
treated more as symbol than man. Thorpe’s 1953 New York Times obituary, 
for example, opens, “Jim Thorpe, the Indian whose exploits . . . won him 
acclaim as one of the greatest athletes of all time, died today in his trailer 
home” (“Jim Thorpe Is Dead on West Coast at 64”). In both football and 
baseball, athletes of Native descent, even when they were stars, were not so 
much integrated as tokenized, caricatured, and themselves treated as mas-
cots. Native American mascots reached their peak of new usage, then, dur-
ing a period of de jure white supremacy, and in tandem with a host of other 
practices that enforced the secondary status of actual Native Americans.
table 3 football mascots chronologically with developments in 
racial segregation and professionalization**
1901 Columbus Panhandles
1901 St. Louis Cardinals
1902 Toledo/ Kenosha Maroons
1905 Detroit Heralds
1906 Canton Bulldogs
1910 Rochester Jeffersons
1915 Staten Island Stapletons
1916 Akron Burkhardts
1916 Muncie Flyers
1916 Providence Steam Roller
1918 Akron Pros
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1919 Green Bay Packers
1919 Racine Legion
APFA [later NFL] formed (1920)
1920 Buffalo All-Americans
1920 Chicago/Decatur Staleys
1920 Cleveland Tigers
1920 Dayton Triangles
1920 Hammond Pros
1920 Rock Island Independents
1921 Chicago Bears
1921 Cincinnati Celts
1921 Cleveland Indians
1921 Detroit Tigers
1921 Evansville Crimson Giants
1921 Louisville Brecks
1921 Minneapolis Marines
1921 Tonawanda Lumbermen
1921 Washington Senators
Ban on use of college players (1922)
1922 Milwaukee Badgers
1922 Oorang Indians★
1923 Duluth Kelleys
1923 St. Louis All-Stars
1924 Buffalo Bisons
1924 Cleveland Bulldogs
1924 Columbus Tigers
1924 Frankford Yellow Jackets
1924 Kansas City Blues
Red Grange Signed (1925)
1925 Detroit Panthers
1925 Kansas City Cowboys
1925 New York Giants
1925 Pottsville Maroons
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1926 Akron Indians
1926 Brooklyn Lions
1926 Buffalo Rangers
1926 Duluth Eskimos
1926 Hartford Blues
1926 Los Angeles Buccaneers
1926 Louisville Colonels
1926 Racine Tornados
1927 New York Yankees
1928 Detroit Wolverines
1929 Boston Bulldogs
1929 Minneapolis Redjackets
1929 Newark/Orange Tornadoes
1930 Brooklyn Dodgers
1930 Portsmouth Spartans
1932 Boston Braves
Segregation instituted (1933)
1933 Boston Redskins
1933 Philadelphia Eagles
1933 Pittsburgh Pirates
1934 Detroit Lions
1934 St. Louis Gunners
First NFL Draft (1936)
1936 Boston Shamrocks
1936 Cleveland Rams
1936 Pittsburgh Americans
1936 Rochester Tigers
1937 Cincinnati Bengals
1937 Los Angeles Bulldogs
1940 Pittsburgh Steelers
1944 Boston Yanks
1944 Brooklyn Tigers
Reintegration begins (1946)
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1946 Buffalo Bills
1946 Chicago Rockets
1946 Cleveland Browns
1946 Los Angeles Dons
1946 Miami Seahawks
1946 San Francisco 49ers
1949 Chicago Hornets
1952 Dallas Texans
1953 Baltimore Colts
1960 Boston Patriots
1960 Houston Oilers
1960 Titans of New York
Washington Redskins Integrate (1962)
1963 Kansas City Chiefs
1963 New York Jets
1965 Atlanta Falcons
1965 Miami Dolphins
1967 New Orleans Saints
1976 Seattle Seahawks
1976 Tampa Bay Buccaneers
1995 Carolina Panthers
1995 Jacksonville Jaguars
1996 Baltimore Ravens
1999 Tennessee Titans
2002 Houston Texans
**Includes NFL teams (current and defunct), plus teams from AFL II, AFL IV, AAFC and APFA (each of 
which featured teams later incorporated into modern NFL). In cases where a “new” team takes the same 
name or mascot as a previously existing team in the same location, I have used the earlier date.
★Only team with Native American mascot to feature Native American players.
Continuing this trend contemporarily are the NFL’s Washington 
Redskins—ironically, the last team in the league to racially integrate, in 
1962 (Smith 2012)—whose team owner Dan Snyder continues to insist that 
“Redskins” honors Native Americans, while refusing to meet with actual 
Native Americans who dispute that characterization. (Cox and Maske 2015) 
Opponents of the activists who speak out against the Redskins mascot, 
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more often than not, express—more or less explicitly—views like those of 
one particularly open author of a letter to the editor of the Washington Post, 
whose argument is based on the claim that the name “never held any such 
weight or meaning for me. . . . As for whether the Redskins name margin-
alizes Native Americans, that battle was lost to the U.S. government and 
non-natives’ greed more than a century ago” (“Letter to the Editor,” empha-
sis mine) The message here is quite clear: Native Americans are not part 
of this conversation—because white views and feelings are the important 
ones, this matter having long been settled. Beyond the Redskins, whose 
mascot is the frequently singled out among other Native American mascots 
for its usage of a slur, teams and communities all over the United States 
continue to instrumentalize fantastical images of Natives while, as Taylor 
puts it, “continuing to treat Indian tribes as wards of the state.” (Taylor 
2013, 145)
With mascotting’s combination of instrumentalization and exclusion 
in mind, it is perhaps telling that one of the most frequently cited argu-
ments made in favor of the continued usage of Native American mascots 
is the importance of upholding a non-Native team’s, or a community’s, tra-
ditions (Callais 2010, 72–73; Silva 2007, 253; Davis 2002, 14). Opponents 
of Native American mascots should take these declarations seriously, 
because, however irrelevant they may appear to the ethical question of 
the usage of such mascots or to the general argument about the harmful-
ness of demeaning imagery, they contain a tacit admission of the role of 
such mascots for the teams and fans that support them. Specifically, they 
contain the tacit admission that mascots are crucial for the perception of 
continuity and persistence of a particular community, and that this conti-
nuity and persistence is (felt to be) of greater importance than any harm 
that might be experienced by those who are instrumentalized to serve 
as mascots. In short, such admissions as the one in the epigram of this 
paper make salient the extent to which Native American mascots are more 
revealing of the white communities that use them than the Native ones 
they purport to “honor.”11 The treatment of Native Americans as mascots 
is racist, then, not only because it involves (or indeed, requires) the prolif-
eration of stereotypical and degrading images of Native Americans. The 
mascotting of Native Americans, in addition, instantiates the particular ill 
of instrumentalizing the persons caricatured by mascot images, treating 
them as worthwhile only insofar as they are effective as unifying symbols 
for someone else’s community. Treating Native Americans as mascots 
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is thus racist in (at least) two ways at once: it disregards Native persons 
by withholding respect and concern for them by portraying them with 
demeaning  stereotypes, and it further withholds respect and concern by 
treating them not as full members of the community, but as a means to 
that community’s ends.
I have argued that Native American mascots are racist in a way that 
goes beyond their being an instance of negative and harmful stereotyp-
ing.12 To understand why, we must first make sense of what mascots in gen-
eral are, and how they function. Mascots, I have argued, contribute to the 
constitution of historically persistent teams, and by extension, in the iden-
tity of the communities that those teams represent. The usage of Native 
Americans as mascots is the reduction of persons to this constitutive role, 
which requires their concomitant instrumentalization and exclusion from 
the community that so instrumentalizes them. Native American mascots 
are thus not merely racist; they are racist in a way that exceeds the racism 
of the mere stereotypical imagery that they use.
notes
1. Although the data on college sports is also fascinating, it is much more unwieldy, 
as colleges more frequently change mascots than do professional teams. The rela-
tive stability of professional sports teams in the United States will be important for 
comparative purposes later in the paper, as I undertake an analysis of the develop-
ment of professional sports mascots from the mid-late nineteenth century through 
the present.
2. See table 1.
3. See King and Springwood, Beyond the Cheers: Race as Spectacle in College Sport 
(SUNY 2001), 55–56. Although this is an otherwise brilliant book, to which I am 
significantly indebted, this claim is simply false.
4. There are a wide variety of sports fans and sports fan experiences, from casual fans 
whose interest in a team is limited to a few important games, to devotees whose 
emotional (and perhaps financial) allegiance to a team is a thoroughgoing element 
of their everyday lives. (Giuliannoti 2002, Crawford 2004, Wann et al. 2001) I will 
not address the varieties of fandom in detail here, beyond making clear that my 
interest in what follows is in the allegiance- and identification-practices of sports 
fans who are actively invested in the fate of a team, rather than merely passive 
spectators, for whom the outcome of a game is inconsequential. Given that there 
are fans with such allegiances and identifications—such that fans are able to feel 
themselves to be ‘part’ of the team for whom they cheer, as Mumford puts it—it is 
crucial to account for the possibility of and motivation for that identification.
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5. Indeed, as Grano and Zagacki (2005) suggest, the rhetoric of sports fans suggest 
that winning and losing of ‘their’ teams is precisely a matter of the community’s 
honor, and/or sense of itself.
6. See table 1.
7. I focus here on professional baseball and football because these sports have the lon-
gest history of professional league competition in the U.S., and thus offer a larger 
range of data. I am restricting this historical analysis to professional teams in order 
to provide a legitimate basis for comparison with the contemporary team mascots 
represented in table 1.
8. For the following paragraphs, see tables 2 and 3, which illustrates a chronology of 
team names/mascots, with dates of significant developments in professionalization 
and racial segregation/reintegration marked.
9. For additional arguments that Native American mascots require the stereotyping of 
Native Americans, see Black 2002, Springwood 2000, and Spindel 2000.
10. See table 3.
11. For more on the idea that Native American mascots reveal more about whiteness 
than “redness,” see King and Springwood 2005, and Taylor 2013.
12. I have not, of course, addressed all of the rich literature on this stereotyping or 
its effects, on either Native or non-Native persons. I have, instead, been focusing 
on the particular effects that are unique to the usage of such stereotyping images 
specifically as mascots.
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